




NARRATIVE INTELLIGENCE

Armenia Pre- Election Information Environment

Main Findings Summary


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Information Environment Overview



The Armenian pre-election information environment is highly negative and dominated by anti-government content. Pro-government and pro-Western counter-messaging is nearly absent, leaving nationalist narratives to dominate unchallenged. Media coverage concentrates on security, conflict, and national identity, while public priorities — particularly the economy — receive substantially less attention.

Short-form video platforms (TikTok, Instagram) represent the highest-risk information space. 32% of videos combine high agitation with high viral potential, 91% of this content is negative, and total reach exceeds 81 million views.



Disinformation spreads more easily than neutral content. Higher-risk content is demonstrably more viral, meaning platform algorithms actively reward emotionally charged narratives and create a

Narratives & Strategic Intent

Three interconnected narratives dominate across all monitored platforms, each targeting a distinct dimension of public trust.

Key Narratives

- 1 Government 'betrayed' Artsakh**
The most emotionally charged narrative, positioning the government's handling of Artsakh as an act of national betrayal. It draws on deep national identity grievances to delegitimise the current leadership.
- 2 Elections are manipulated**
Undermines confidence in the integrity of the electoral process. By framing the vote as pre-determined, it demoralises potential government supporters and justifies abstention.
- 3 Peace with Azerbaijan equals surrender**
The normalisation process with Azerbaijan is reframed as capitulation, activating nationalist sentiment and tying foreign policy directly to the electoral choice.

The primary strategic goal is **voter suppression**, not persuasion. Opposition audiences are mobilised through anger while pro-government supporters are demoralised and discouraged from voting. This two-track strategy is consistent with documented foreign information manipulation techniques.

Opposition Mobilisation


High-anger content drives turnout through outrage, using the Artsakh and 'surrender' narratives as primary tools.

Government Demoralisation

Messaging targets pro-government and pro-Western audiences to discourage engagement with the political process.

Foreign Information Manipulation (FIMI)

Approximately 23% of all monitored content aligns with known foreign information manipulation narratives. Activity is highly concentrated — a small number of accounts generate the majority of this content, a structural signature consistent with coordinated inauthentic behaviour.



The convergence of narrative concentration, platform virality dynamics, and the near-total absence of counter-narratives creates an information environment that is highly vulnerable to coordinated manipulation ahead of the election.